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INTRODUCTION 
Entrepreneurs and investors, along with employees, customers, and 
others, have become increasingly interested in social enterprises. The 
owners of these businesses pursue a dual objective of creating social goods 
while also achieving profits.1 Several new legal forms of business 
associations have evolved recently to attempt to address the challenges 
that social enterprises face, with benefit corporations so far being the 
leading new type.2 Most benefit corporations, and more generally social 
enterprises to date, are new, small, and closely held businesses. They do 
not enjoy the benefits or face the challenges of having publicly traded 
shares and large numbers of shareholders. 
                                                     
* Professor and Dorsey & Whitney Chair in Law, University of Minnesota Law School.  I thank 
participants at the Berle VIII Symposium at the Seattle University School of Law for helpful 
comments. 
 1. See generally Robert A. Katz & Antony Page, The Role of Social Enterprise, 35 VT. L. REV. 
59 (2010); Heerad Sabeti, The For-Benefit Enterprise, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov. 2011, at 98. 
 2. See generally Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, 62 EMORY L.J. 
681 (2013); Joseph Yockey, Does Social Enterprise Law Matter?, 66 ALA. L. REV. 767 (2015). 
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But there are a few publicly traded social enterprises,3 and if social 
enterprises are to succeed on a large scale, some day there will need to be 
many more. Publicly traded benefit corporations will face unique 
challenges that do not exist, in the same form, for either ordinary publicly 
traded corporations or for closely held benefit corporations. In particular, 
balancing accountability of the managers of the business with a firm, 
ongoing commitment to both corporate objectives—doing good and 
making money—may prove extremely difficult.4 How might publicly 
traded benefit corporations address these challenges? What sorts of 
supporting institutions and practices might develop to help? Might stock 
markets play an important role? 
This Article explores those questions. Part I begins by considering 
the leading benefits and costs for a benefit corporation that chooses to go 
public.5 It starts there both to begin gaining an understanding of the 
challenges public companies will face and also to consider whether going 
public is likely to actually be an attractive option at all for some set of 
social enterprises. Some of the benefits and costs of going public are the 
same for benefit corporations as for ordinary corporations—access to new 
sources of capital and new accountability mechanisms are benefits, but 
legal compliance and pressures from shareholders to show quick results 
are costs. But, there are also special benefits and costs for benefit 
corporations, or the benefits and costs that other companies face may play 
out differently for social enterprises. On the benefit side, access to new 
sources of capital may be even more important for social enterprises, 
which may find it harder to attract investors given the commitment to 
doing good. Additionally, founders and early investors may use publicly 
traded stock as a way of achieving a profitable exit from their investment, 
though this benefit may be less important to investors in social enterprises 
whose desire for profit may be tempered by the desire to do good as well. 
Going public also shifts control from the founders and early investors to 
the board of directors, which could possibly allow for more commitment 
to the social mission of the business. But, the shift in control may pose a 
risk to the social mission. Public shareholders, especially shareholder 
activists, may create pressures to pursue profit at the expense of the social 
mission. 
Part II considers early experiments in publicly traded social 
enterprises, or at least arrangements that come close to being such.6 It 
                                                     
 3. See discussion of Etsy and Laureate Education, infra notes 58–70 and accompanying text. 
 4. See generally Brett H. McDonnell, Committing to Doing Good and Doing Well: Fiduciary 
Duty in Benefit Corporations, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 19 (2014). 
 5. See infra notes 15–27 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra notes 34–83 and accompanying text. 
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surveys various public exchanges such as the Social Stock Exchange in 
the UK,7 the Social Venture Connection in Canada,8 and the Impact 
Exchange in Singapore and Mauritius.9 It also surveys early experiments 
in crowdfunding of social enterprises, online sites for impact investing by 
accredited investors, and a few individual corporations, including Laureate 
Education, a Delaware public benefit corporation, which (as of the time of 
writing) has filed an S-1 registration statement10 in preparation to go 
public, and Etsy, a B Lab-certified public corporation. Finally, Part II 
ponders various lessons to be learned from these early experiments. 
Part III moves to consider various mechanisms by which benefit 
corporations, investors, stock markets, and other gatekeepers might be 
able to realize the benefits of going public while minimizing the costs.11 
Disclosure of actions taken to advance a firm’s social mission can give 
incentives to behave well, to maintain a good reputation, and to provide 
information to investors that could affect their choice of which firms to 
invest in. The revised fiduciary duty of benefit corporations may also help 
ensure that they pursue their dual missions, with a greater chance of suits 
being brought in public companies with thousands of shareholders 
(potential plaintiffs) if the corporation fails to pursue their dual mission. 
Board representation rules and processes could give various stakeholder 
groups other than shareholders a say in decision making. Relatedly, 
various stakeholder groups could be given several possible kinds of voting 
rights. Dual-class share structures may help ensure that control remains 
with shareholders committed to the social mission. Time-phased or tenure 
voting may give more power to shareholders with long-term interests in 
the company. And, investor screening devices may help keep investors 
that are not committed to a company’s mission from investing in that 
company. Finally, a variety of gatekeepers could help ensure 
accountability and fidelity to the corporate mission. Possible gatekeepers 
include certifiers like B Lab, auditors, insurers, lawyers, and exchanges 
themselves. 
Finally, Part IV focuses on the specific role of stock exchanges and 
similar institutions as ways to help facilitate the various governance and 
shareholding mechanisms discussed in Part III.12 Exchanges, through their 
                                                     
 7. SOCIAL STOCK EXCHANGE, http://socialstockexchange.com/ [https://perma.cc/YZ5M-RKJR]. 
 8. SOCIAL VENTURE CONNECTION, https://svx.ca/en [https://perma.cc/7VH9-Z3N3] [hereinafter 
SVX]. 
 9. IMPACT EXCHANGE, http://impactexchange.asiaiix.com/ [https://perma.cc/5V2F-3EDY]. 
 10. When a company “goes public” it must file a registration statement with the SEC, containing 
quite an extensive disclosure. The registration statement which companies going public typically use 
is Form S-1. 
 11. See infra notes 85–132 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra notes 17–26 and accompanying text. 
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listing requirements, could require or encourage the mechanisms 
discussed in Part III. If different exchanges create different requirements, 
they would allow experimentation as to what works and what doesn’t, 
reducing the challenges that publicly traded benefit corporations will face. 
Exchange listing could also work as a branding device for companies. 
Exchanges could provide a focus for the involvement of various corporate 
gatekeepers, helping to coordinate expectations and best practices for how 
social enterprises should govern themselves to best pursue their dual 
missions. 
I. BENEFITS AND COSTS OF GOING PUBLIC 
Social enterprises, as I use the term here, are businesses that are 
committed to both generating economic returns for their investors while 
also pursuing one more social missions.13 The benefit corporation is a new 
legal form created to respond to the perceived needs of social enterprises. 
Benefit corporations are business corporations, governed by the standard 
rules of corporation law except for a few characteristics: their corporate 
purpose includes pursuing a social mission; their fiduciary duties require 
directors and officers to consider the effect of decisions on stakeholders 
other than shareholders; and, they must regularly report on what they have 
done to pursue their social missions.14 In this Article, I am mostly 
concerned with the practical and legal issues surrounding benefit 
corporations that become publicly traded, but much of the discussion of 
those issues applies to social enterprises more broadly. 
We start by exploring the benefits and costs to a benefit corporation 
of having publicly traded shares. This makes sense as a starting point for 
(at least) two reasons. First, a core premise of this Article is that if benefit 
corporations (and social enterprises more generally) are to succeed and 
become a significant part of the economy, some of the most successful 
companies will want, and need, to go public. Exploring the benefits and 
costs of going public will help us understand why that may be so and hence 
why we need to examine measures to help public markets adapt to the 
needs of benefit corporations. But it is also worth keeping in mind that the 
premise may be false; that is, even if benefit corporations become a 
significant part of the economy, they may rarely—if ever—benefit from 
                                                     
 13. See generally sources cited supra note 1. 
 14. For an overview of benefit corporations, see generally WILLIAM H. CLARK, JR. ET AL., WHITE 
PAPER: THE NEED AND RATIONALE FOR THE BENEFIT CORPORATION: WHY IT IS THE LEGAL FORM 
THAT BEST ADDRESSES THE NEEDS OF SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS, INVESTORS, AND, ULTIMATELY, THE 
PUBLIC (Jan. 13, 2013), http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Benefit_Corporation_White_ 
Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/XV3P-WR3H]; CORP. LAWS COMM., ABA BUS. L. SECTION, BENEFIT 
CORPORATION WHITE PAPER, 68 BUS. LAW. 1083 (2013). 
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going public. In that case, this Article can be taken as a cautionary tale of 
the problems involved for benefit corporations that go public. 
A second reason for starting with an overview of the benefits and 
costs of going public focuses in particular on the costs. There are certainly 
challenges facing any social enterprise that chooses to go public. The 
remaining sections of this Article explore various means by which 
companies, investors, and markets can try to address and reduce the 
relevant costs. Therefore, one must then start with an overview of the most 
important costs. 
Let us start with the benefits of going public. Public stock (and bond) 
markets can provide a significant source of capital for businesses. That 
point can be overstated—for years, U.S. stock markets have seen a net 
outflow of funds as dividends and share repurchases exceed the amount of 
new money invested through share issues.15 Still, a company listed on a 
stock exchange has an important way of raising money available to it that 
other companies lack. This benefit is obviously not unique for benefit 
corporations—it is a major reason why any company chooses to go public. 
However, raising money could conceivably be an even bigger 
consideration for social enterprises than more conventional companies, 
because social enterprises can find it particularly hard to raise capital due 
to their dual missions.16 Because they may choose to prioritize their social 
mission over profits if the two conflict, investors may fear that social 
enterprises will earn lower returns, lowering the return on their 
investments. Thus, social enterprises may need to explore a wider range 
of potential investors, and public markets could be one option that helps 
meet their needs. Of course, as I shall soon discuss,17 one may suspect that 
investors in publicly traded companies are even more profit-centered than 
other investors, making them a poor fit for social enterprises. However, 
perhaps there are some contexts and some pools of potential investors that 
are more favorable. In Part II, I will discuss crowdfunding as one sort of 
public or quasi-public fundraising that may be particularly attractive to 
benefit corporations because already popular forms of nonequity 
crowdfunding are associated with public good-oriented giving.18 
                                                     
 15. Bob Bryan, The Biggest Force Powering the Stock Market is Starting to Disappear, and It 
Could Be a Huge Problem, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 12, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/buybacks-
disappearing-could-mean-recession-2016-3 [https://perma.cc/9CFH-YLYU]. 
 16. See generally Susan N. Gary, Is It Prudent to Be Responsible? The Legal Rules for Charities 
That Engage in Socially Responsible Investing and Mission Investing, 6 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 106 
(2011); Paul Brest & Kelly Born, When Can Impact Investment Create Real Impact?, STAN. SOC. 
INNOVATION REV. (2013); Antony Bugg-Levine et al., A New Approach to Funding Social 
Enterprises, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2012, at 118. 
 17. See infra notes 30–33 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra notes 77–83 and accompanying text. 
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Another benefit of going public is that it provides a potentially 
lucrative way for company founders and early investors to exit with big 
gains on their investments. This is another benefit that is shared with other 
types of corporations.19 However, it would seem to be a weaker benefit for 
benefit corporations than for traditional profit-oriented companies. After 
all, the founders and investors of benefit corporations will presumably care 
somewhat less about profit and somewhat more about doing good than the 
founders and investors of other businesses and so the prospect of a big 
payout after going public will be less important to them. But less important 
does not mean totally unimportant; founders and investors of benefit 
corporations do seek profit (or else they could form as nonprofits and gain 
tax advantages), so the big payout on going public will matter at least 
somewhat in some cases. 
A final potential benefit of going public is that it typically shifts 
effective control from the main shareholders (usually the founders and 
early investors) to the directors and officers of the corporation.20 There are 
problems associated with this—the separation of ownership and control 
and its result agency costs are, after all, the leading concern of American 
corporate law and governance.21 But especially in the context of benefit 
corporations, there is an important potential benefit. When push comes to 
shove, shareholders—even shareholders who have chosen to invest in a 
benefit corporation—may push to prioritize profits over social mission. In 
a closely held corporation, the board will generally be tied to and 
controlled by a controlling shareholder or group of shareholders.22 In a 
public corporation with enough of a dispersed ownership structure, the 
directors and officers will be less directly subject to effective shareholder 
control.23 That may allow them to pursue their own interests, but it also 
allows them to pursue the interests of other stakeholders and specified 
public goods. Such is the model of the board as mediating hierarch in the 
theory of Blair and Stout24 and, if it ever applies, it applies better in public 
than in closely held corporations. 
                                                     
 19. Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: 
Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 257–64 (1998). 
 20. A common, though not universal, feature of U.S. public corporations is that they have no 
shareholder who owns a high enough percentage of shares to effectively control the business. See 
Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 471 (1999). 
 21. A point first brought to sustained attention in ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE 
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
 22. See Cynthia S. Grandfield, The Reasonable Expectations of Minority Shareholders in Closely 
Held Corporations: The Morality of Small Businesses, 14 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 381, 382–83 (2002). 
 23. See generally BERLE & MEANS, supra note 21. 
 24. See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate 
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999). 
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Of course, there are problems with this change in governance 
structure, which leads us to the costs of going public. One cost for all types 
of public companies is various compliance costs that come with being 
public. These have increased in recent years with various provisions of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley25 and Dodd-Frank26 Acts. Some blame the decline in 
companies going public on these increased costs,27 although that claim is 
disputed.28 This cost is not unique to benefit corporations, though insofar 
as one contemplates additional rules for benefit corporations (e.g., 
additional disclosure rules) the costs could be higher for them. 
More fundamentally, the change in ownership and governance 
structure has perils as well as promise. One of these is traditional for any 
type of public corporation: the separation of ownership and control may 
make it easier for managers to make decisions that benefit themselves at 
the expense of shareholders and other stakeholders.29 
Another problem with the change in ownership structure is that the 
business loses control over who its shareholders are. This loss of control 
opens up companies to the possibility of a hostile takeover and, more 
relevantly, opens them up to the rising number of activist shareholders.30 
Even for ordinary corporations, shareholder activism has led to concern 
that managers are becoming more short-term in their focus as a way of 
heading off unwanted shareholder activism.31 There is much debate over 
whether this is true, and even if it is, whether that is a bad thing. I have 
argued elsewhere that the evidence is quite murky, but it does seem 
plausible that there is at least a somewhat significant problem.32 
                                                     
 25. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. 
 26. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376. 
 27. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REG., INTERIM REPORT x–xi (2006), http://capmktsreg.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/08/Committees-November-2006-Interim-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/657X-
KKE4]; COMM’N ON THE REG. OF U.S. CAPITAL MKTS. IN THE 21ST CENTURY, REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 6 (2007), http://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/ 
06/Commission-on-the-regulation-of-us-cap-markets-report-and-recommendations.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z6SN-DALV]. 
 28. See generally Robert Prentice, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Evidence Regarding the Impact of SOX 
404, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 703 (2007). 
 29. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); BERLE & MEANS, supra 
note 21. 
 30. Activist shareholders buy significant shares in a corporation and then pressure the 
management of that corporation to make organizational or operational changes that they believe will 
increase the share price. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The 
Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545 (2016). 
 31. See generally Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Short- and Long-Term Investors (and 
Other Stakeholders Too): Must (and Do) Their Interests Conflict?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 396 (Claire A. Hill & Steven Davidoff Solomon eds., 2016). 
 32. Id. 
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This short-termism problem is worse for benefit corporations. The 
shareholder activists seek profits, not doing good. Moreover, insofar as 
doing good has reputational benefits that increase profits in the long run, 
pressure to increase profits in the short term may make companies less 
sensitive to those benefits.33 Thus, the pressure of effective shareholder 
activism raises a major concern that benefit corporations that go public 
will face mission drift and, over time, come to prioritize profits over social 
benefits, thereby challenging their core defining feature and purpose. 
Do the benefits of going public outweigh the costs for benefit 
corporations? That is hard to answer in the abstract, and it may well differ 
for different companies. Indeed, for most benefit corporations the costs 
will continue to outweigh the benefits as is the case for most businesses of 
all sorts. The more precise question is whether a significant number of 
successful benefit corporations will find the benefits of going public 
outweigh the costs. 
One should not quickly jump to conclude that the answer is yes. The 
costs are real and the benefits are uncertain, and maybe benefit 
corporations should and will remain limited to closely held entities. But 
the answer may depend in part upon what can be done to control the costs 
identified above. The rest of this Article is devoted to exploring 
mechanisms that may control the costs. For those skeptical about whether 
public benefit corporations will ever make sense, consider this an 
exploration of the difficulty of reducing the costs of going public. For 
those more optimistic about the prospects of public benefit corporations, 
the following parts will explore possible practices that could develop to 
help support those corporations. 
As one considers the leading unique benefits and costs of going 
public for benefit corporations, one sees that they must strike a difficult 
balance between maintaining the accountability of officers and directors 
(and thus avoiding self-dealing); reducing pressures to follow the dictates 
of profit-focused activist shareholders (and thus avoiding mission drift); 
while overall leaving managers the discretion to make difficult choices 
while still credibly committing to achieve both profits and social good. 
II. EARLY EXPERIMENTS 
Rather than speculate in a vacuum about how benefit corporations 
should handle the challenges of becoming publicly traded, let us start by 
looking at early experiments that may shed light on what might work. As 
of this writing, there is no company organized legally as a benefit 
corporation that has shares listed on a public stock exchange, much less 
                                                     
 33. Id. 
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any stock exchange that particularly focuses on listing benefit 
corporations. However, there are various exchanges and online portals that 
are in the neighborhood of being such exchanges as well as individual 
companies that are close to being publicly traded benefit corporations. To 
consider the experiences of some of these institutions is a useful first step. 
Sarah Dadush’s Regulating Social Finance 34 is a valuable article that 
reviews three early experiments in public exchanges for social enterprises 
that were all formed in 2013. One of those public exchange experiments 
is the Social Stock Exchange (SSX) based in the United Kingdom.35 At 
the time of Dadush’s article, the SSX was simply an online information 
portal for social enterprises that were already listed on a traditional 
exchange.36 The idea of the portal is to inform interested investors about 
these companies so that they can then buy their shares if they are suitably 
impressed. The SSX has now partnered with the ICAP Securities and 
Derivatives Exchange (ISDX) to create a market-trading segment on 
ISDX for SSX member companies.37 
To join the SSX (and thereby gain access to investors in the ISDX), 
companies must be approved by an Admissions Panel and prepare an 
Impact Report. The Impact Report both provides the core information on 
which an admissions decision is based, and provides disclosure to 
investors and the general public about what social goals a company is 
pursuing, and what it does to pursue those goals. The Impact Report is 
prepared with the assistance of an independent analyst and must be 
updated annually.38 As Dadush emphasizes, the guidance as to what 
Impact Reports must contain is broad, and hence Reports vary 
considerably.39 Listed companies are not required to report any specific 
quantitative metrics. There is also little to nothing in the way of 
governance standards that companies must follow.40 Also, as Dadush 
rather critically emphasizes, SSX does nothing to explicitly screen 
investors in SSX-listed companies (indeed, investors purchase on a 
different platform, ISDX or some other traditional exchange, not through 
SSX itself).41 
                                                     
 34. Sarah Dadush, Regulating Social Finance: Can Social Stock Exchanges Meet the 
Challenge?, 37 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 139 (2015). 
 35. SOCIAL STOCK EXCHANGE, http://socialstockexchange.com/ [https://perma.cc/YZ5M-
RKJR]. 
 36. Dadush, supra note 34, at 193. 
 37. Our Markets, ISDX, http://www.isdx.com/about-us/our-markets/ [https://perma.cc/N5MH-
TXTU]. 
 38. Dadush, supra note 34, at 195–97. 
 39. Id. at 194–97. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 198. 
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The second institution Dadush examines is the Social Venture 
Connection (SVX) in Canada.42 SVX is a platform for accredited investors 
to find and connect with social enterprises that list share offerings on it. 
Thus, SVX is not a full-fledged exchange because buyers are limited to 
accredited investors and because it is a platform for initial offerings by 
companies to investors, not for reselling shares on a secondary market. In 
order to be listed on SVX, issuers must either self-report a score of at least 
100 on the Global Impact Investing Rating System (GIIRS) or get B Lab 
certified (which requires a GIIRS rating of at least 80, audited by B Lab).43 
Once listed, these scores must be regularly updated.44 Therefore, in 
contrast with the broad qualitative standards of the SSX Impact Reports, 
SVX relies on the detailed quantitative metrics embodied in the GIIRS 
ratings. 
SVX also makes an effort to screen its investors. The Investors 
Agreement contains the following warning: 
Investing in issuers whose offerings are posted on the SVX online 
platform has significant risk. The main objective of these issuers is 
not to maximize returns to the investors and you should invest in 
issuers whose offerings are posted on the SVX online platform only 
if you are prepared not to receive any return on your investment and 
to lose your investment in its entirety.45 
The Investors Manual states that its investors are “[i]mpact-first 
investors with a focus on achieving positive social and/or environmental 
outcomes with patient capital investments.”46 SVX retains the right to 
terminate investor access to the platform. Dadush approvingly notes these 
efforts to screen out impatient investors who are not focused on social 
impact—SVX is the only one of the three exchanges she examines that 
does so.47 
Dadush’s third subject is the Impact Exchange (IX), a joint project 
of the Stock Exchange of Mauritius and the Impact Investment Exchange 
Asia, based in Singapore.48 IX aims to be a full-fledged public exchange 
for social enterprises, with secondary trading occurring on its platform and 
                                                     
 42. SVX, supra note 8.  
 43. SVX, SVX ISSUER MANUAL, 15, http://s3.amazonaws.com/svx.staging/comfy/cms/files/ 
files/000/000/173/SVX_Issuer_Manual-original.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5QE-EZB4]. 
 44. Id. 
 45. SVX, SVX INVESTOR MANUAL 19, http://s3.amazonaws.com/svx.staging/comfy/cms/ 
files/files/000/000/178/SVX_Investor_Manual-original.pdf [https://perma.cc/BDH9-KZ9Z]. 
 46. Id. at 13. 
 47. Dadush, supra note 34, at 205–06. 
 48. IMPACT EXCHANGE, http://impactexchange.asiaiix.com/ [https://perma.cc/5V2F-3EDY]. 
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not limited to accredited investors. So far, no companies are listed, only a 
few impact bonds.49 
For a company to be listed on IX, it must meet a variety of 
requirements. It must specifically state that a positive social or 
environmental impact is “its primary reason for existence.”50 It must 
commit to “ongoing monitoring and evaluation of impact performance 
using clearly defined impact indicators for performance assessment and 
reporting.”51 It must prepare annual reports on its social impact “in 
accordance with Impact Exchange reporting principles”52 (These 
principles are not clearly spelled out, at least not in publicly available 
documents.). And, it must have been certified by an independent social or 
environmental ratings body.53 To help ensure applicant companies 
adequately comply with these standards, applicants are assigned an 
Authorized Impact Representative to help them complete the process.54 
There appear to be no restrictions on who can invest and less attempt to 
weed out unwelcome investors than at the SVX. 
Beyond these three examples analyzed by Dadush, a variety of other 
institutions exist, at least within the neighborhood of being public 
exchanges for social enterprises. Many of these institutions are online 
investing platforms for accredited investors focused on impact 
investments (indeed, SVX is an example). Another example is Mission 
Markets (MMX).55 Investments offered on MMX include “funds, project 
finance, structured debt products and later stage private and public 
companies in addition to earlier stage offerings that we may, from  
time-to-time, also list.”56 Investors are mostly limited to accredited 
investors—there does not appear to be an explicit attempt to weed out  
nonimpact investors. All listed entities must include their performance 
under an approved third-party sustainability metric, such as GIIRS. They 
also require an Impact Reporting and Investment Standards (IRIS) 
indicated result metric.57 
The experience of some individual companies, rather than exchanges 
or portals, also may yield some insight. As of now, there is not a single 
                                                     
 49. These are pooled investments of bonds issued to various enterprises. 
 50. IMPACT EXCH., IMPACT EXCHANGE BOARD LISTING GUIDE 10, 
http://impactexchange.asiaiix.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/03/Impact_Exchange_Listing_Guide_Fe
b2014_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7UX-Q2NF]. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 14–15. 
 55. MISSION MARKETS, http://www.missionmarkets.com/ [https://perma.cc/B4UY-B3SV]. 
 56. Frequently Asked Questions, MISSION MARKETS, http://www.missionmarkets.com/ 
#!faq/c1r2k [https://perma.cc/H7TX-4M9D]. 
 57. Id. 
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company legally organized as a benefit corporation that is publicly traded. 
However, there are some close calls. Laureate Education is a Delaware 
public benefit corporation that has filed an S-1 registration statement in 
preparation for going public; although, it has not yet completed its Initial 
Public Offering (IPO).58 Laureate is a leading for-profit provider of higher 
education with its business mostly concentrated in Latin America.59  
For-profit higher education is a controversial field with concerns that such 
providers make profits at the expense of quality, often relying on 
government-subsidized student loans.60 Benefit corporation status may be 
a way for Laureate to try to commit to maintaining a focus on its public 
educational mission despite its for-profit status. As such, the difficulty of 
maintaining such a dual commitment is a major question mark surrounding 
Laureate, and the effectiveness of its mechanisms for avoiding mission 
drift is a significant question for the company. 
Laureate uses dual-class stock to allow founders and early investors 
to maintain control over the business while bringing in more equity 
investors.61 We will discuss dual-class stock more below.62 Suffice to say, 
it is controversial, and many academic commentators have complained 
that dual-class stock splits control from a financial stake in a company’s 
success.63 Still, it could be an effective way to prevent mission drift driven 
by shareholder activism in social enterprises. Laureate also has a high debt 
level.64 This could create a potential incentive to take on too much risk, 
but for a social enterprise, it may also be a way to gain additional financing 
without issuing shares that could relinquish control to shareholders who 
lack adequate commitment to the mission. Laureate states that it plans to 
become a B Lab certified corporation,65 adding B Lab as an outside 
certifier of Laureate’s commitment to pursuing the public good. 
Another notable company is Etsy. Etsy is a B Lab certified company 
that went public in 2015.66 It is not a benefit corporation, but under B Lab’s 
current rules, it will eventually need to become one if it wishes to remain 
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certified. Etsy is an eBay-like online craft market. Its brand revolves 
around a focus on independent artisanship, explaining its desire to identify 
as a social enterprise.67 Since going public, its performance raises some 
questions about both sides of the dual mission. On the for-profit side of 
the ledger, Etsy’s stock price since going public has dropped 
precipitously,68 even more than the large drop that is typical for newly 
public companies.69 On the social mission side of the ledger, Etsy has 
generated significant controversy when it transferred much of its 
intellectual property to an Irish subsidiary because of Ireland’s status as a 
tax haven.70 The use of Ireland and other jurisdictions to avoid U.S. taxes 
has been a major political controversy for some time, and Etsy’s action 
has raised awkward questions about whether a commitment to doing good 
is consistent with aggressive techniques to avoid paying taxes.71 
More loosely related to our topic, many significant public companies 
are like Laureate in that they use dual-class stock.72 These are not benefit 
corporations or B Lab certified, but might some of them qualify more 
informally as social enterprises? As noted above in discussing Laureate, 
though dual-class stock creates serious concerns, it can potentially be 
justified as a way to retain control in the hands of early shareholders 
strongly committed to the dual mission while still bringing in new public 
shareholders who provide additional equity.73 There are at least two 
distinct classes of public companies using dual-class stock. The first class 
is media companies, including the New York Times and the Washington 
Post.74 Their use of dual class stock is justified on a quite plausible social 
enterprise-like ground. Newspapers, after all, do profess to advance the 
public good by providing reporting and information that is essential to 
deliberative decision making in a democracy. Serious investigative 
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reporting can be quite expensive with an uncertain payoff, so a pure  
for-profit company may not invest as much money in such reporting as a 
social enterprise with a dual mission. The second prominent class of public 
companies with dual-class stock consists of high tech companies, most 
famously Google and Facebook.75 Can these plausibly be portrayed as 
social enterprises? Google does, after all, proclaim a motto of “[d]on’t be 
evil,”76 but one can perhaps be excused for having some skepticism on this 
point. 
A final emerging example of something resembling a public market 
for benefit corporations is the new field of equity crowdfunding.77 
Crowdfunding for pure donations, or in return for rewards, has been 
around for some time and has become a significant source of financing for 
many small businesses. However, equity crowdfunding (going online to 
raise money in return for issuing equity interests) has, until recently, been 
essentially impossible under federal securities law. Congress attempted to 
change this with the CROWDFUND Act, part of the JOBS Act passed in 
2012.78 However, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) rules 
needed to implement the crowdfunding provisions did not take effect until 
May 2016.79 So, there is still little data for equity crowdfunding. 
It seems plausible that crowdfunding may become a major source of 
funding for benefit corporations.80 Indeed, it may be the most probable 
route by which benefit corporations will become a major part of the 
economy. Older and quite successful forms of crowdfunding are focused 
on enterprises that seem socially attractive, and crowdfunding is attractive 
to younger generations raised online.81 Additionally, this demographic 
also seems more likely to be interested in social enterprise.82 Very early 
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evidence suggests there may indeed be a connection between equity 
crowdfunding and social enterprises. DrinkerBiddle collected data on the 
first fifty company filings under the new crowdfunding regulations. Seven 
of these filings were by benefit corporations, benefit LLCs, or B Lab 
certified companies. That is 14% of the filings—quite disproportionately 
high given the still tiny number of benefit corporations relative to all new 
businesses in the country.83 
Thus, though there is not yet a true public exchange devoted to 
benefit corporations, or social enterprises more generally, there are a 
variety of institutions and individual companies that are providing early 
experiments in how an ecosystem for publicly traded benefit corporations 
might evolve. Disclosure is an important element across most of these 
experiments; although, standards are still in flux and emerging. There has 
not been a lot of focus on governance mechanisms at the exchange level, 
but individual companies are experimenting with at least one such 
mechanism: dual-class stock. Exchanges and companies seem to be 
focusing on attracting a new type of impact investor interested in a dual 
mission of profit and social good. However, not a lot has been done yet in 
finding ways to keep out investors who may focus too much on short-term 
profits at the expense of social mission. We explore these issues and 
mechanisms more in Part III. 
III. GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS 
The challenges facing benefit corporations, and social enterprises 
generally, are different from those facing other companies but not radically 
new. The various corporate governance mechanisms used for traditional 
for-profits are also available to benefit corporations and starting to be used 
by them. We can see many of them at work in the early experiments 
discussed in Part II. Part III will be a discussion of the most significant 
types of corporate governance mechanisms, and how they are already 
being adapted to benefit corporations and potentially could be further 
adapted. 
Disclosure is a central element in the experiments described above, 
which should come as no surprise. Disclosure is of course the central 
strategy of U.S. securities law and the leading way in which we regulate 
public companies.84 Disclosure is also a central element in the new state 
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laws creating benefit corporations. Those statutes have two main elements 
that distinguish benefit corporations from others. One is the new fiduciary 
duties (discussed next in our list of governance mechanisms).85 The other 
is regular benefit reports, which benefit corporations must produce and 
give or make available to their shareholders.86 Most of the statutes (though 
notably not Delaware) require that companies use an independent,  
third-party standard with which to measure themselves in these reports; 
although, they do not require using third-party auditors to certify the 
accuracy of their reporting.87 
The exchanges discussed in Part II feature disclosure as their shared 
central regulatory strategy. They handle their disclosure requirements in 
differing ways. The SSX Social Impact Report rules set out a vague set of 
qualitative standards.88 By contrast, SVX requires use of the detailed 
quantitative rules of the GIIRS rating system.89 Third-party auditing is not 
required by SVX, but B Lab certification is encouraged insofar as a 
company can be listed with a lower rating if it is B Lab certified as opposed 
to self-reporting.90 The IX reporting standards are not yet clear (at least not 
in public), but they do require use of an outside Authorized Impact 
Representative to ensure compliance.91 MMX requires use of a third-party 
quantitative metric, such as GIIRS.92 
Going forward, there are a variety of issues and options for benefit 
corporations and social enterprises. For example, do we need more 
uniformity in reporting by benefit corporations? Uniformity helps make 
comparisons across companies easier—a leading justification for 
securities regulation.93 On the other hand, as the social missions of benefit 
corporations may vary wildly, information that matters to investors may 
vary correspondingly. Moreover, at this stage, social impact measures are 
still evolving, and companies and investors are still learning what 
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information really matters, as well as how to collect, measure, and report 
that information.94 Premature uniform regulation may cut short a valuable 
learning process. As will be discussed below,95 one benefit of regulation 
through exchanges is that it allows some significant uniformity (across 
companies listed on a given exchange) while still allowing for diversity 
and learning across exchanges. 
Beyond the content of disclosure, important questions remain 
concerning the process by which disclosure is created. Most importantly, 
should third-party auditing and certification be required? B Lab96 is the 
main actor here so far, though there are others. As summarized above, 
some of the new exchanges require a third-party certifier, while others do 
not. Outside certifiers can obviously increase the reliability of the content 
in the disclosure. However, they increase compliance costs. Also, insofar 
as the issuers pay for certification, the problems that traditional ratings 
agencies have faced in recent years suggest challenges that could become 
an issue for social enterprise rating agencies should their ratings come to 
have significant value in public markets.97 Thus, who watches the watchers 
is a serious question. This is another area where exchanges could play a 
useful role. Is there a need for new government regulation, either of 
individual benefit corporation reporting, of third-party certifiers, or of 
exchanges focused on social enterprises? At this stage, given how new and 
evolving the field is, new specific regulation seems premature. After all, 
public companies will be subject to traditional securities fraud rules. But 
should public social enterprises and possibly exchanges for them become 
much more widespread, the SEC will presumably want to study how those 
entities are handling disclosure. 
In this era of online offerings and trading, one form of airing 
information that may deserve more exploration is social media. People 
today are quite used to using sites like Yelp and TripAdvisor to rate 
businesses. This could be a very useful way of airing information about 
the performance of public social enterprises. Of course, such online sites 
are also clear targets for securities fraud. This is another area where 
exchanges could play a role in creating and policing bulletin boards about 
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listed companies (and if that happens, it is another area I am sure that the 
SEC will want to monitor). 
Another traditional corporate governance mechanism is fiduciary 
duty.98 The directors and officers of a corporation have a duty to make 
decisions that they reasonably believe are in the best interests of the 
corporation. Of course, what counts as the best interests of a corporation 
is a long-standing debate.99 The central legal innovation of benefit 
corporations is the statutory formulation of fiduciary duties to explicitly 
require that directors and officers consider not just the financial interests 
of shareholders, but also the interests of a wide range of corporate 
stakeholders, typically including employees, creditors, customers, the 
community, and the environment.100 However, many commentators fear 
that the statutes build in so many limits to potential lawsuits for violation 
of these duties that the new duties are basically toothless.101 There is a 
tough balancing act—making the duties too strong and easily enforceable 
risks scaring off anyone from founding benefit corporations because any 
decision risks hurting some set of stakeholders.102 
The early experiments in public exchanges discussed above do little 
or nothing to explicitly address fiduciary duty. As far as duties are 
concerned, legally publicly traded benefit corporations are no different 
from those that are closely held. However, there is a practical effect of 
going public that could be crucial: public companies have many more 
shareholders and thus, many more potential plaintiffs in a fiduciary duty 
lawsuit.103 Moreover, public companies will generally lose control over 
whom owns their shares. If they underperform financially, they may find 
activist shareholders buying up shares in order to try to force the board to 
take actions that raise the share price.104 These actions may be in conflict 
with a company’s social mission. Thus, the expansion of the shareholder 
base that comes with going public may make the duty lawsuit a stronger 
accountability device but may also create more pressure to move away 
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from social mission. Counterbalancing this: under the benefit corporation 
duty rules, shareholders themselves may sue if they think the company has 
drifted away from its social mission.105 Thus, directors and officers face 
possible lawsuits for overemphasizing either side of their dual mission, 
and with more shareholders, whose composition they may not be able to 
control, their exposure to such lawsuits may be a concern. 
Rules and practices concerning board representation (or 
representation at other levels of decision-making) are another potential 
governance mechanism. For traditional public corporations, the move to 
requiring independent directors for various board committees and boards 
overall has been a leading governance development in recent decades.106 
The Model Benefit Corporation Act provides for the possibility of 
appointing benefit directors, who would be responsible for specifically 
focusing on how a company is pursuing and achieving its social mission.107 
The exchanges discussed in Part II do not appear to have focused much on 
this type of mechanism. One exception to that statement is the IX 
requirement that listed companies must commit to “ongoing monitoring 
and evaluation of impact performance using clearly defined impact 
indicators for performance assessment and reporting.”108 
More could be done with board representation. One could have 
constituency directors actually elected by the members of stakeholder 
groups other than shareholders. In some countries, most notably Germany, 
co-determination via employee representatives on boards is an important 
instance of that strategy.109 Germany also illustrates another possible 
mechanism: a two-tier board structure.110 The management board is 
composed of insiders, but the supervisory boards of public companies are 
composed of representatives elected by shareholders and employees. The 
supervisory board structure, focused on monitoring and setting broad 
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strategy rather than more detailed decision-making, may be an appropriate 
place to focus on representing the interests of various stakeholders.111 
Below the full board level, stakeholders could be represented on 
committees of various kinds. These could be board or sub-board level 
committees.112 The committees could focus on various topics, with 
different stakeholder groups represented on different committees 
depending upon the nature of their interests. Committees could be merely 
advisory or could have more significant decision-making authority. There 
are many variants possible, depending upon which stakeholder interests 
one would like to see represented, and who might have the authority to 
appoint representatives of those interests. To date, exploration of 
representative strategies to advance stakeholder interests has been an 
underexplored mechanism in the social enterprise movement. 
These representation mechanisms focus on ways in which  
nonshareholder constituencies might be given an indirect voice in 
decision-making. Another set of mechanisms concerns voting by 
shareholders, for which the standard is one share/one vote.113 NYSE and 
Nasdaq rules114 limit the ability of listed companies to deviate from one 
share/one vote after they have gone public, but allow deviations from this 
rule at the time of going public.115 The main example of such a deviation 
is dual-class shares. With dual-class shares, one class of shares has more 
voting power than another class. Depending upon the numbers, this can 
allow a small group of shareholders to retain voting control over the board 
even though others hold a majority of the financial interest in the company. 
As noted above, Laureate Education, looking to become the first publicly 
traded benefit corporation, has dual-class shares. Leading media and high 
tech companies also use this structure. 
As noted above,116 dual-class shares are highly controversial. The 
conventional wisdom among corporate law scholars and economists is that 
the structure creates rotten incentives.117 Those with control of the 
company do not have a corresponding financial stake in the company, and 
may thus be tempted to make decisions that help them while hurting the 
share value. On the other hand, dual-class shares may be a way of 
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protecting against the pressures of mission drift that can come with public 
share ownership. If one seeks financial investment by public shareholders 
but fears that those shareholders, or their successor purchasers, will seek 
high share values at the expense of social mission, dual-class shares are a 
way of bringing those shareholders on board while limiting their influence. 
These competing effects illustrate the competing considerations facing 
publicly traded social enterprises. 
Other shareholder voting mechanisms are also possible. One 
mechanism that has received some attention is time-phased or tenure 
voting.118 With this system, shareholders receive more per-share voting 
rights the longer they hold their shares. This is meant to reduce the 
pressures to overemphasize short-term profits. A short-term focus may 
hurt nonshareholder constituents insofar as keeping groups such as 
employees and customers happy may result in better long-term 
performance. It is debated whether short-termism is really a problem in 
current American public companies, but I have argued elsewhere that it 
could well be.119 There is limited experience to date with tenure voting and 
the empirical evidence surrounding it is uncertain (as empirical evidence 
so often is). However, the theoretical and empirical arguments in favor of 
tenure voting are real enough that they at least suggest that further 
experimentation should be allowed.120 
A related but different proposal comes from Colin Mayer.121 Under 
his proposal, shareholders would register their shares for a set period of 
years. The voting power of the shares would decrease with the time 
remaining for their registration. Unlike tenure voting, instead of rewarding 
past long-term holding, this system would directly tie voting power to the 
length of time the shareholders are committed to ownership. 
Another possible shareholder-focused mechanism is shareholder 
screening. In closely held companies, the founders and early investors are 
generally able to control who the shareholders are: by careful selection of 
initial investors, by the lack of a market for shares, and by contractual 
mechanisms such as rights of first refusal. Going public generally entails 
the loss of that control. Might there yet be ways to screen out investors 
with inappropriate goals, especially those with an inadequate commitment 
to a company’s social mission? Dadush emphasizes this question, and is 
generally critical of the exchanges she examines for their lack of any such 
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screening device.122 She approvingly points to the SVX for its clear 
warnings to investors that listed companies may have lower financial 
returns than more traditional businesses.123 Might there be other ways of 
screening beyond warnings and clear disclosure of the dual mission nature 
of benefit corporations? For more quasi-public type markets, exchanges or 
portals may retain some control over who is allowed to trade on the 
exchange. Investors who demonstrate a lack of commitment to the goals 
of the exchange could be excluded, as suggested in the rules of the SVX.124 
However, how one would determine when such a remedy is appropriate 
seems rather murky. 
A final type of governance device relies on gatekeepers.125 Corporate 
gatekeepers are outside professionals who help monitor the behavior of 
corporate managers and certify to investors and others that their behavior 
is appropriate. Gatekeepers include ratings agencies, auditors, insurers, 
lawyers, investment banks, and stock exchanges, among others. For 
traditional for-profit companies, the governance role of gatekeepers has 
received increased attention in recent years.126 As with all governance 
mechanisms considered here, the gatekeeping role can be adapted to the 
needs of social enterprises, and that adaptation is already happening. 
B Lab is the most obvious and important gatekeeper in the benefit 
corporation field so far.127 B Lab plays a central role in both creating 
disclosure standards and also in certifying how well specific companies 
satisfy those standards. Several of the new exchanges rely upon disclosure 
rules generated by others, like the GIIRS.128 Crucial to the success of 
benefit corporations is convincing interested investors, as well as 
employees and customers, that the companies are credibly committed to 
their dual missions.129 Certifiers like B Lab help create credibility, 
although as noted above, the issuer pays model could threaten that 
credibility, as has happened with the ratings agencies’ scandals of recent 
years. 
Corporate lawyers are another potential set of gatekeepers. Law 
firms may play a leading role in helping bring more reputable companies 
public, and investors could look to the involvement of such companies for 
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assurance.130 Such firms also play a major role in guiding companies and 
in spreading best practices concerning good corporate governance. Might 
law firms arise specializing in benefit corporations? If so, they could play 
a significant role in helping encourage more such companies and more 
widespread investment in them.131 
Another related set of corporate gatekeepers consists of investment 
banks, broker-dealers, and the sponsors of investment funds. These 
securities firms are financial intermediaries that gather information about 
potential prospects for investment and then help inform would-be 
investors about attractive target investments. Some securities firms now 
offer funds or other products that focus on social enterprises. The Impact 
Bonds mentioned above that are sold on IX are an example.132 MX also 
offers managed funds.133 There are plenty of other examples. 
Finally, stock exchanges are themselves important gatekeepers, as 
are similar institutions, such as portals for crowdfunding. Because these 
are the main focus of this Article, Part IV looks more closely at the role 
that they can play in light of the existing experiments discussed in Part II 
and the various governance mechanisms discussed in this Part III. 
IV. THE ROLES OF EXCHANGES 
As we explore what sorts of practices and institutions may help 
publicly traded benefit corporations thrive, exchanges present a useful 
intermediate level of institution. As compared with legal regulatory 
reforms, certainly at the level of federal securities law and to a lesser extent 
also at the level of state business association law, exchanges provide an 
opportunity for experimentation and diversity. Experimentation is 
important because it is still early in the development of social enterprises, 
and we do not have a good sense as to what sorts of governance practices 
are likely to work. As to diversity, the concept of “social enterprise” covers 
a wide range of types of enterprises. Practices that work well for some 
businesses within that range may not work as well for others. If a range of 
exchanges or similar market places for public social enterprises develops, 
different exchanges can provide an infrastructure for different kinds of 
enterprises.134 
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Much experimentation can, and will, of course, occur at the level of 
individual businesses. However, to succeed, especially at the level of 
larger, publicly traded entities, businesses must attract and retain investors, 
creditors, employees, customers, and other stakeholders. They need to 
coordinate the expectations of those various groups, credibly conveying 
information about how they are pursuing their dual missions while 
developing practices and routines for effectively balancing sometimes 
competing aims.135 Gatekeepers of the sort discussed at the end of Part 
III136 may help in this emerging coordination of expectations, and 
exchanges could be an effective locus for some of this coordination. Let 
us consider how that might develop for the various governance 
mechanisms discussed in Part III. 
Disclosure will be a major concern of exchanges focused on benefit 
corporations, or social enterprises more broadly. Although disclosure by 
public companies is now heavily regulated under federal securities law, 
much of the early development of that disclosure occurred within the 
exchanges.137 Publicly traded benefit corporations will, of course, be 
subject to the securities rules that govern all public companies, but for the 
specific concerns of disclosure related to social enterprise status, 
regulation through exchanges, rather than through the law, presently 
appears more attractive. As noted above, exchanges face a variety of 
questions about disclosure. How detailed and quantitative should they 
require disclosure to be, and should they require certification by outside 
companies like B Lab? If exchanges do choose to require specific and 
quantitative disclosure, should they write their own rules or require 
compliance with standards devised by other organizations, and if the latter, 
should they settle on one set of standards or allow listed companies to 
choose from a range of options? There are some tough tradeoffs and those 
tradeoffs may change over time. For instance, prematurely settling on just 
one detailed standard may cut off useful experimentation and learning. On 
the other hand, as we come to get a better sense of what disclosure is 
useful, early diversity may be pared down as investors look for more 
uniform disclosure so that they can more easily compare companies. 
Looking at other governance mechanisms, exchanges seem unlikely 
to play much of a role in the development of fiduciary duty rules. 
However, they could play a significant role in shaping rules surrounding 
board representation and shareholder voting. After all, traditional 
exchanges have played a major role in shaping such rules for traditional 
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companies.138 Should exchanges for social enterprise require or encourage 
some form of representation or voting by nonshareholder constituencies? 
Should they allow, or even encourage, deviations from the one share/one 
vote rule for shareholders? Online bulletin boards for investors are one 
mechanism that exchanges (and similar institutions, such as portals for 
crowdfunding and other sorts of online investing) may be particularly 
well-placed to foster and regulate. As noted above, younger investors in 
particular are quite familiar with these sorts of online sites in other 
contexts, and they could prove a highly valuable governance device for 
publicly traded enterprises. They could also prove a locus for securities 
fraud. Striking a balance between allowing such sites to achieve their 
potential for good while limiting their potential for harm will be 
challenging. Exchanges and similar institutions should get a first shot at 
attempting such regulation, although the SEC is unlikely to allow them to 
do so without oversight. 
Finally, exchanges may serve as a locus for coordinating the 
involvement of the other gatekeepers discussed above. The exchanges, in 
creating and modifying their corporate governance listing rules, will both 
draw upon and help shape practices developed by other gatekeepers. We 
have just discussed how this can work in setting disclosure rules and Part 
II discussed how new exchanges have drawn upon the rules of standard 
setters like GIIRS and B Lab.139 
Lawyers will play a major role in advising and drafting rules for 
representation and voting, as well as disclosure, and will also play a role 
in helping choose and manage relationships with exchanges. Thus, if one 
or a few exchanges come to play a major role in listing publicly traded 
benefit corporations (or other kinds of social enterprises), corporate 
lawyers working with such companies will both pay attention to and help 
disseminate the rules and practices of those exchanges, while also helping 
to shape them. 
Investment banks, broker-dealers, and the promoters of social 
enterprise stock and bond funds are other potentially significant 
gatekeepers as discussed above. These securities firms and professionals 
will frequently work with and through exchanges if they are available and 
well-used. Some of the new social enterprise exchanges are already 
creating space for stock and bond funds.140 Indeed, even some traditional 
exchanges are working to create spaces for socially responsible 
companies, e.g., with sustainability indices. 
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CONCLUSION 
Social enterprise is a new concept, and benefit corporations are an 
even newer attempt to provide a legal instrument for carrying out social 
enterprises. So far, there are not many benefit corporations and almost all 
of them are small, closely held businesses. This particular social 
experiment may never go much further than this. However, the concept of 
benefit corporations may become widely adopted. If so, we may face a 
time when a number of benefit corporations are or want to become 
publicly traded. 
Publicly traded benefit corporations will face some unique corporate 
governance questions, related to but distinct from the questions that face 
both closely held benefit corporations and publicly traded traditional 
corporations. Addressing those questions will require new variations on 
corporate governance mechanisms. Many new practices will need to be 
developed, requiring the input of many different kinds of institutions. 
Stock exchanges, or similar trading platforms for widely held 
corporations, could play a significant role in these developments. Some 
experiments have already begun that begin to suggest what such 
exchanges might look like. We surveyed some of those developments in 
Part II. Part III looked more closely at some of the main categories of 
corporate governance mechanisms: disclosure, duty, representation, 
voting, and gatekeepers. Would-be promoters of future exchanges aimed 
at benefit corporations would do well to consider the kind of roles and 
supporting guidance such exchanges might provide to help shape those 
governance mechanisms. 
